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In an ideal corporate management structure, directors should act in 
the best interest of the shareholders. In doing so, the directors' actions 
are governed by certain legislation which specifies their duties and 
this legislation is also relevant to the shareholders with respect to 
their rights. Although there are legislations which govern the 
relationship between directors and shareholders, there are still latent 
problems. These hidden problems could be regarded as fault lines in 
the relationship of these two parties. In a family business structure, 
these fault lines could bring worse effect compared to “non-family” 
companies as the directors are dealings with shareholders who are 
also family members. Another arising scenario which could arise is 
where directors are not part of the family members but have to deal 
with shareholders/members who are related to the owner of the 
company. This paper intends to highlight the fault lines which could 
occur between directors and shareholder in family owned companies. 
The main term of reference of this paper is the corporate governance 
principles and practices. This paper also aims to propose some 
mechanisms, through legislations in which problems which arise from 
the fault lines could be reduce if not resolved.  
 






The role played by family business or family owned companies in a country’s 
economy development has been significant throughout the globe. According to 
Cruz (2001), 65 to 80 percent of businesses worldwide can be classified as family 
business. In the United State of America (USA), family firms made up over 90% 
of business in the North America and accounted for 78% of all new job creation, 








60 % of the nation’s employment and 50% of the GDP.1 In Germany, 84.4% of all 
manufacturing companies are classified as family business.2  
 
It is interesting yet unfortunate to see that most studies on family business are 
focused on family firms in the developed countries, such as the United States of 
America, United Kingdom and European countries while for the Asian side, there 
are many writings on China, particularly on the entrepreneurships culture but as 
for Malaysia, there are very few writings or statistics which demonstrate the 
proportion and significance of family business to the nation economy.   
 
The structure of family business is unique compared to the non-family business as 
it combines three elements together under the name of the business. The family 
relationships, composition of owners and management structure, which inter-
mingle with one another often, give rise to governance issues. This paper intend to 




There are many writings, which describe and define family business. Generally, it 
refers to a business structure in which the ownerships, the management and the 
decision making power are retained and intended to be only for the family 
members. The restrictions are structured as such from the beginning as it is meant 
to establish a business legacy of the family name. 
According to BDO Stoy Howard, a family business center in UK, a business shall 
fit in as a family business if at least one of the following conditions applies:3  
• a single family holds more than 50% of the voting shares, supplies a 
significant proportion of the company's senior management and is 
effectively controlling the business.  
• more than one generation is involved in the business.  
• the family regards the business as a family business. 
 
A website publication of Purdue University,4 highlighted that to understand 
family business and its unique character, one have to consider the three different 
but interrelated components of the structure, namely: 
• family,  
• business and 
• ownerships. 
 
The first component of family refers to a group of two or more persons related by 
blood (biology) and/or by legal relationship (marriage, adoption, in some states 
common law marriage). An emotional bond usually accompanies this relationship. 
The nature of this bond and its strength varies widely among families. The 
purpose of a family is oriented toward people and relationships. As a result, 
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family members may tend to approach relationships with one another in the same 
manner as they do in their family, rather than as they might with a business 
colleague who is not from the same family.5 
The second component is business. A business is an economic unit, a commercial 
enterprise that produces, distributes and/or exchanges goods and services with 
customers. The purpose of a business is to accomplish specific tasks as efficiently 
as possible and to realize a reasonable profit from the accomplishment of those 
tasks. People in business tend to relate to one another in a hierarchical manner 
based on defined roles (job descriptions, e.g.) that are designed to further the 
business.6 
 
The third component is ownership. An owner is someone who has legal claim to 
the assets of the business and who may risk his or her own personal assets in 
hopes of realizing a profit. The purpose of ownership of a business is generally to 
realize a return on investment and to minimize the risk involved in the investment. 
In many cases, ownership in a family business may remain in the hands of one 
family member, or within a small group of family members. In other cases, 
ownership may include non-family members as when a company has incorporated 
and sold shares.7 
 
In a family business structure, these three components will be overlapping and 
created three types of domain.8 
 
In the single domain, it may involve 
1. family only; this is referring to family members who do not work in the 
business or have ownership. 
2. Business only: this is referring to non-family employees. 
3. Ownership only: this is referring to outside shareholders. 
 
People who are involved in a single domain will probably have less knowledge of 
the other domains and may have different expectations. For example, a parent 
who was not involved in the business will tend to support the business without 
regard to that person's qualifications and experiences and will tend to make 
decisions based on parental (or other family roles) rather than the basis of a 
business. 
 
Non-family employees are also single-domain players. They work for the 
company, but do not have the same interests as owners or family members. They 
may feel a conflict between their own hopes and dreams and those of family 
employees, particularly when family employees are promoted or when family 
members discuss business issues at home, thus excluding non-family employees 
from the discussion 
 
In the double domain area, the combination could be  

















1. Family + Business; this is commonly referring to employed family 
members, not owners. 
2. Family + Owner; this is commonly referring family shareholders who do 
not work in the business. 
3. Business + Owner; this is commonly referring employee shareholders. 
 
In the Three Domain area, all three components are overlapping; Family + 
Business + Owner= family members involved in all three domains. Family 
members who work in the business and are owners have their feet planted in all 
three domains and probably are the most knowledgeable about the inherent 
workings of all three domains because they have more frequent and intimate 
interaction with all three domains, they may feel great responsibility, or exert 
greater authority when it comes to business issues. While they may do this 
legitimately, it often leads to conflict with other family members who have a stake 
in the business, but less access to information and decision-making. 
 
These family members probably have the clearest view about how profits should 
be divided between salaries, retained earnings and shareholder dividends, but may 
not understand the viewpoint of others who do not have the perspective of all 
three domains. 
 
The themes which underpined the family business are relationships and their 
obligations, particularly those of father to son and brother to brother, and the 
values of reciprocity and respect.9 There are two main factors which justify the 
survival of family business:10 
• Decisiveness in the marketplace which allows the companies to be 
aggressive and effective. 
• The family ties/relationship ensure cohesiveness and trust that 
makes such companies formidable adversaries. 
 
Nonetheless, despite its secured tenure in the market place, the extension of 
family business faced two main threats.11 Firstly, the inability of succeeding 
generations to maintain the entrepreneurial spirit and success of the founders. 
Secondly, the issue of sustainability. A family business is claimed to be able to 
expand only up to a certain size, and beyond that size, the enterprise can only 
operate effectively through the application of more universal rules, more 
impersonal processes, and without reliance on individual links of kinship. 12 This 
second factor is actually the impetus behind this paper which meant to highight 
the possible diversion of ownership in the due course of expansion of the family 
business 
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Malaysian Family Business. 
 
The report of a national survey covering 225 companies conducted by Grant 
Thornton and Malaysian Institute of Management in 200213, stated that majority 
of family businesses in Malaysia is small scale enterprises and generally managed 
by the founder. Manufacturing, retailing or constructions are the notable sectors in 
which family business ventured most.14 It is also found that most of the family 
businesses were initiated by people having six years or more of work experience. 
This indicates that in Malaysia, people with appropriate experience commenced 
family businesses. 
 
The report also underlines the characteristics of family business in Malaysia, 
which can be summarized as: 
•     59% of the business is still run by the founder and 30% are run by the 
second generation, the majority of whom are children of the founder.  
•     65% of small scale enterprises are managed by the founders 
•     55% of family businesses in the small scale enterprises employ less 
than 51 persons 
•  35% of family businesses in the medium scale enterprises employ 
between 
 51 - 250 persons.  
• 10% of family businesses from large scale enterprises employ more 
than 250 persons. 
• Main activity of family business lies in manufacturing (35%), followed 
by retailing (12.9%) and construction (10%). 
 
The concerns in Family Business 
 
 Report of the survey highlighted two main concerns  in a family business 
structure:  
1. Means to finance the business 
2. Involvement /Participation of family member 
 
Although this two factors are seen to be distinct, in practice they are actually 
interrelated with one another. In starting up, carrying out and exapnding the 
business, often family business faced not only the challenge of getting sufficient 
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Chart 1 : Concerns over losing control if outsiders were to involve in 














The above chart showed that it is in the small scale business that members are 
most  concerned about losing control if they obtain external finance. For the large 
scale busiess, the concern on external participation is not much on the financing 
aspect but rather on the possibility of change in the management system. 52% of 
the respondents from the large scale business express their concern on the 





As regards to family involvement, the survey’s report stated that 48% of the large 
scale enterprises seemed to be less concerned about bringing family members into 
business as compared to the small scale (31%) and the medium scale enterprises 
(29%). Nevertheless, majority of the respondents, regardless sizes of business, 
strongly agree that: 
1. Children should be introduced to the business at an early age 
2. Children's education should be geared towards the business needs. 
3. There can only be one management successor 
4. Criteria should be set up to decide how family members join and leave 
the business 
5. The business is stronger with family members involved 
6. Parents should retire when the children are ready to take over the 
business 
7. Founder and subsequent generations should always have a formal role 
in the business 
8. Family and business affairs should be kept separate- 
9. Professional advisers should understand the unique issues facing the 
family business. 
  
For the children’s participation, the report highlighted that:  
• 21% of the respondents wanted their children to be involved in the 
business 








• Of the 24% of children involved in the family run business: 
- 46.5% is the first child 
- 28.2% is the second child 
- 13.7% is the third child 
- 11.4% is the fourth child. 
• 52% of respondents are in the opinion that their children should join 
the business only if they wanted to and this was especially derived 
from respondents in the large scale enterprises (69%). 
 
The survey also seeks responses on outsiders’ participation in the family business.  
It was found that only 39% of the respondents from the large scale business were 
concerned about outsiders coming into the business and take control of the 
business whilst in the medium scale businesses, 43% of the respondents expressed 
their concern about external participation in the family business. On top of that, 
44% of the respondents in the medium scale business expressed their worry over 
losing control if outsiders are allowed to be in the family business.    
 
Statistics produced by the 2002 Report highlighted the main issue which is meant 
to be discuss in this paper; the conflicts between control and 
ownership.                                                       
 
Control and Ownership 
 
The dichotomy of control and ownership, which is the essence of directors-
shareholders relationship, is the main spectrum of the fault lines. Thus, it would 
be essential to elaborate the dichotomy of control and ownership in a company 
before discussing the fault lines evolving from it. 
 
Separation of control and ownership occurs in a situation where shares are widely 
dispersed or where the shareholders are not involved in management of the 
company. This situation would be inevitable in a public company. The 
shareholders who own shares in the companies are known as the owners whilst 
the directors who manage the companies are said to have control over the entities. 
Berle and Means have earlier discussed the concept of control and ownership in 
their book The Modern Corporation and Private Property.15 The writers averred 
that a greater dispersion of share ownership would cause a decrease of the 
shareholders' power and interest in the company.16 This is known as a separation 
of ownership from control. They argued that as a result of the separation of 
ownership from control, shareholders would no longer have charge of the 
direction of the company and the directors are vested with wider power in 
developing the company.17 
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Consequently there will be a divergence of interest between the managers and 
owners in certain situation. According to Dr Saleem Sheikh and Professor SK 
Chatterjee 
 
The divergence of interest between ownership and control had created a division 
of functions. Within the corporation, shareholders had only interests in the 
enterprise while the directors had power over it. The position of the shareholders 
had been reduced to that of having a set of legal and factual interests in the 
enterprise.18 
 
When there is a separation between the owners and the controllers in a company, 
there is a possibility that the interests of the shareholders would not be carried out 
since they have no control over the running of the company. In other words such 
divergence would cause the company to depart from the traditional theory of 
profit maximising behaviour.19 This is because the directors who are the managers 
have the control, and would act towards maximisation of their own lifetime 
incomes.20 Control according to Edward S. Herman21 relates to power - 
the capacity to initiate, constrain, circumscribe, or terminate action, 
either directly or by influence exercised on those with immediate 
decision-making authority. 
 
Thus the directors might disregard the interests of the shareholders which should 
be their paramount consideration. Though the directors may own some shares, 
their ownership is usually the result of their executive positions rather than the 
cause of their holding such positions.22 Therefore these directors who operate the 
business of the company  are primarily motivated by their own self-interest, which 
may not coincide with the interest of the owners.23 
 
Moreover, the separation of ownership from control limited owners to being 
satisfiers instead of maximisers.24 This means the shareholders will be satisfied 
with the dividend received without participating in the management of the 
company for the purpose of obtaining maximum profit. When the owners lack 
control of the company, they become unfamiliar with the policies engaged by it.25 
As a result, the managers may aim at achieving steady growth of earnings instead 
of maximising profits for the owners.26 This situation is also known as 
shareholders passivity. Cohen Committee acknowledged that the lack of active 
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participation from the shareholders was due to the separation of ownership from 
control.27 Furthermore the dispersion of capital among an increasing number of 
small shareholders made them pay less attention to their investments and they are 
content with the dividends which are forthcoming.28 However the Cohen 
Committee averred the need for a separation of ownership from control: 
Executive power must inevitably be vested in the directors and is 
generally used to the advantage of the shareholders. There are, 
however, exceptional cases in which directors of companies abuse 
their power and it is, therefore, desirable to devise provisions which 
will make it difficult for directors to secure the hurried passage of 
controversial measures…29 
 
This is indeed true since not all shareholders have the knowledge to manage the 
business of the company and it will be more appropriate to hand over that matter 
to more qualified persons like the directors. The directors should therefore be 
treated as mere managers of the company and should manage the company in 
conformity with the policies approved by the shareholders.30 Therefore the Cohen 
Committee as well as the Jenkins Committee which was set up in 1962 has 
recommended disclosure of the company’s activity to remedy any possible abuse 
of powers by the directors. The latter had also agreed that the existence of 
separation of control from ownership was essential for the general good of the 
company.31 Thus the report in the Jenkins Committee focused more on the 
directors' powers and shareholders' control. It has been observed that the Jenkins 
Committee was concerned with the issue whether shareholders who contribute the 
equity of a company should really be involved in the management of a company 
and the directors should perform their duties without being involved in the 
ownership of the company to avoid any conflict of interest.32 In other words the 
separation of ownership from control is something inevitable, but the directors 
should not abuse the control and the shareholders should be allowed to monitor it 
only to a certain extent so as not to interfere with the directors' freedom i.e. to do 
what they think best in the interest of the company. This is supported by Lipton 
and Rosenblum33 who viewed that the relationship between managers and 
shareholders is a problematic one in the modern public company and there should 
be a system where these two parties may work co-operatively towards the 





                                               
27
 In Board of Trade, Report of the Company Law Committee (1945) Cmnd 6659 (Cohen 
Committee) 
28




 Above note 3, at 10. 
31
 Ibid and above note 13. 
32
 Above note 3, at 11. 
33
 Above note 3, at 45. Refer also Lipton and Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate 
Governance: The Quinquennnial Election of Directors, The University of Chicago Law Review 
(1991) 87. 









General power to manage 
 
Generally, companies would adopt article 73 of Table A of Fourth Schedule in its 
articles of association. The article speaks about on whom lays the power to 
manage the company. The article provides: 
The business of the company shall be managed by the directors who 
may exercise all such powers of the company as are not, by the Act 
or by these regulations, required to be exercised by the company in 
general meeting, subject, nevertheless, to any of these regulations, to 
the provisions of the Act, and to such regulations, being not 
inconsistent with the aforesaid regulations or provisions, as may be 
prescribed by the company in general meeting… 
 
There are two main points in this article. The first limb prescribes the directors’ 
general power to manage a company whilst the second limb explains the 
limitations to that power. The former indicates that if the management of a 
company is vested with the directors, the members i.e. the shareholders may not 
give instruction to the directors or override their decision.34 Harman J. in 
Breckland Group Holdings Ltd v London Suffolk Properties Ltd & 
Ors35confirmed that the powers of the board are independent of the shareholders 
and further held: 
 
The principle, as I see it, is that the articles confides the 
management of the business to the directors and in such a case it is 
not for the general meeting to interfere...If the board does not adopt 
it, a general meeting would have no power whatever to override that 
decision of the board and to adopt it for itself.36 
 
This denotes that directors having a general power to manage have control over 
the company. The second limb which provides limitation regarding directors’ 
power to manage had been subject to certain argument. The majority viewed that 
directors have autonomous powers to manage the company and they were against 
any interference by the owners in managing the company.37 Those with this view 
are more inclined to leave matters relating to the management of the company in 
the hands of the directors.  Nevertheless, in certain cases shareholders are allowed 
to interfere to limit the directors’ powers to manage,38  however this view had not 
been taken up and developed and had even been ignored. 
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Refusal to Register Transfer of Shares 
 
It has been provided by section 98 of the Companies Act 1965 that shares of any 
member in a company shall be movable property, transferable in the manner 
provided by the articles. However the right of the shareholder to transfer its shares 
would subject to restrictions stated in the Companies Act 1965 and also in the 
articles of association.39 Though these restrictions are meant primarily for the 
private companies,40 it would be essential to discuss the issues here since family 
owned companies could also be in the form of private company. 
 
Restriction to transfer shares could be in the form of Article 22 of Table A where 
directors may decline to register any transfer of shares to a person whom they do 
not approve or which the company has a lien. However, in most cases companies 
have adopted an article which goes far beyond Article 22. For instance in Re 
Smith & Fawcett Ltd41 the article provided that “ the directors may at any time in 
their absolute discretion and uncontrolled discretion refuse to register any transfer 
of shares”. The court of appeal in this case upheld this article and added that it 
would not be necessary for the directors to give reasons. Such a decision was later 
reinforced in the Malaysian case of Kesar Singh v Sepang Omnibus Co Ltd42. In 
the above circumstances directors are left with wide discretion and absolute power 
to refuse to register a transfer of shares. When the directors were empowered by 
the article with“ absolute discretion and unlimited power and without assigning 
any reasons” to refuse the registration of any shares they can be said to have a 
veto power on that matter and would be difficult for anybody not even the owners 
(i.e. the shareholders) of the company to challenge it. The unlimited power to 
refuse to register the transfer of shares exercised by the directors may affect 
directors-shareholders relationship. 
 
Nevertheless the exercise of such power by the directors is limited by their 
fiduciary duty to exercise it bona fide in the best interests of the company as 
pointed out by Lord Greene MR in Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd43. This means 
dissatisfied shareholders may challenge the directors’ action by proving mala fide. 
However as averred by M.T. Lazarides44 bad faith is difficult to be proved in the 
absence of a requirement to give reasons ( for the refusal to register transfer of 
shares ). It is only when reasons are given, either required or not, the court will 
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examine its legitimacy. In Lim Ow Goik & Anor v Sungei Merah Bus Co Ltd45, the 
court had examined the reasons given though it was not required and held that it 
was an improper exercise of power by the directors. Also in Re Bells Bros Ltd46, 
Chitty J. had ordered for the registration of the proposed transfer since the reason 
given was not justifiable. In this case the directors refused to register a transfer on 
the grounds that the transferee was not a member of the Bell family and the court 
considered that the directors, in rejecting the transfer based on the policy of 
keeping shares within the family had exercised the power on a wrong principle 
and for reason not within the legitimate purposes of their power.  
 
In the absence of the requirement to provide reasons for the refusal to register a 
transfer of shares by the directors, the rights of the shareholders might be 
jeorpadised. To leave the directors with absolute power and uncontested 
discretion would be unfair to the shareholders who own the company. Thus 
appropriate provisions would be necessary to balance the absolute power, which is 
normally given to the directors who control the company 
 
Power to File Winding Up Petition 
 
A company may be wound up by way of voluntary winding up or compulsory 
winding up. The latter which have been discussed by Section 217(1)(a) of the 
Companies Act 1965, needs to be initiated by a petition filed by the company 
concerned. However, the provision is silent on whether the shareholders’ approval 
is necessary before a company files the winding up petition. In other words the 
word ‘company’ stated in that provision refers to whom; the board of directors or 
the shareholders or both.The interpretation on that issue is given by case laws and 
it can be divided into two i.e. those which require the shareholders’ sanction and 
those which do not. Some of the Australian cases like In re Standard Bank of 
Australia47 and In re Birmacley Products Pty Ltd48, the court held that it was 
necessary to obtain the shareholders’ approval before a petition to wind up a 
company could be made. In coming to this decision the courts referred to the old 
English case of Smith v Duke of Manchester49 where Bacon VC held that on such 
an important question of whether a company should be destroyed or not, the 
shareholders should have a right to express their views. In re Standard Bank of 
Australia50, Hodges J in discussing the fight of a company file for a winding up 
petition had also elaborated that the article which rendered powers to the directors 
to manage the business of the company did not include the power to destroy the 
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company. Therefore before filing for a winding up petition, the directors must first 
obtain the shareholders’ consent. 
 
On the other hand, cases like Re Inkerman Grazing Pty Ltd51, Spicer & Anor v 
Mytrent Pty Ltd & Ors52 and Re New England Agricultural Corporation Ltd53, 
allowed the directors in the absence of the shareholders’ sanction to file a winding 
up petition. Street J in Re Inkerman Grazing Pty Ltd54 viewed that directors have 
the power to file a winding up petition on behalf of the company by virtue of 
Article 73 of Table A ( which discussed about directors’ power to manage the 
corporation ) and during financial crisis it would be justified for the directors to 
resolve to that procedure without seeking the approval of the shareholders. 
 
In Malaysia, VC George in the case of Miharja Development Sdn Bhd  & 8 Ors v 
Loy Hean Heong & 9 Ors55 upheld the decision of Street J. According to the 
learned trial judge, the effect of and the practice in respect of Section 217(1)(a) of 
the Companies Act 1965 was that the directors of a company may petition for the 
winding up of a company without obtaining the sanction of the shareholders. 
According to Choong Yeow Choy56 this should not be conclusive since it was 
only a High Court decision and the court in construing the articles of association 
of a company should be mindful of the fact that the shareholders as owners of the 
company should have a say in a crucial decision like winding up.57 Loh Siew 
Cheang58 who disagreed with the reasoning given in Re Inkerman Grazing Pty 
Ltd59 and Spicer v Mytrent60, opined that directors as persons who manage the 
financial affairs of the company  might be the one who trigger the company’s 
financial crisis and it is not right to let them wind up the company without 
consulting the shareholders.61  
 
The above are examples of the fault lines in which may happen in family owned 
companies. These fault lines are the result of the ambiguity concerning the locus 
of certain powers in a company. Failure to resolve them may affect the standard of 
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The separation of ownership from control would result the directors or managers 
more dominant than the owners or the shareholders. The definite meaning of the 
provisions concerning control and management is essential to ensure that the 
directors will not abuse their authority and powers. It is necessary to determine 
whether or not the power is absolute and whether or not it allows for the 
interference and control by the shareholders. It is also necessary to determine if 
the shareholders are allowed to interfere in the management of the company , to 
what extent this may affect the power of directors. If not alleviated these fault 
lines may disrupt the corporate governance of a corporation. Since separation of 
ownership from control is something, which is obscure in family owned 
companies the practices of corporate governance principles, such as accountability 
and disclosure are essential to formulate an acceptable standard of transparency as 
a means of check and balance between directors and shareholders. 
